Deep Learning (DL) systems are rapidly being adopted in safety and security critical domains, urgently calling for ways to test their correctness and robustness. Testing of DL systems has traditionally relied on manual collection and labelling of data. Recently, a number of coverage criteria based on neuron activation values have been proposed. These criteria essentially count the number of neurons whose activation during the execution of a DL system satisfied certain properties, such as being above predefined thresholds. However, existing coverage criteria are not sufficiently fine grained to capture subtle behaviours exhibited by DL systems. Moreover, evaluations have focused on showing correlation between adversarial examples and proposed criteria rather than evaluating and guiding their use for actual testing of DL systems. We propose a novel test adequacy criterion for testing of DL systems, called Surprise Adequacy for Deep Learning Systems (SADL), which is based on the behaviour of DL systems with respect to their training data. We measure the surprise of an input as the difference in DL system's behaviour between the input and the training data (i.e., what was learnt during training), and subsequently develop this as an adequacy criterion: a good test input should be sufficiently but not overtly surprising compared to training data. Empirical evaluation using a range of DL systems from simple image classifiers to autonomous driving car platforms shows that systematic sampling of inputs based on their surprise can improve classification accuracy of DL systems against adversarial examples by up to 77.5% via retraining.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) [24] systems have achieved significant progress in many domains including image recognition [13] , [22] , [38] , speech recognition [17] , and machine translation [20] , [37] . Based on their capability to match or even surpass human performance, DL systems are increasingly being adopted as part of larger systems in both safety and security critical domains such as autonomous driving [6] , [10] , and malware detection [12] .
Such adoption of DL systems calls for new challenges, as it is critically important that these larger systems are both correct and predictable. Despite their impressive experimental performances, DL systems are known to exhibit unexpected behaviours under certain circumstances. For example, in a reported incident, an autonomous driving vehicle expected another vehicle to yield in one of the rarer circumstances, and crashed into the other vehicle when the expectation proved incorrect [3] . There is an urgent need to verify and validate behaviours of DL systems. However, a significant part of existing software testing technique is not directly applicable to DL systems. Most notably, traditional white-box testing techniques that aim to increase structural coverage [4] is not very useful for DL systems, as their behaviour is not explicitly encoded in their control flow structures.
A number of novel approaches towards testing and verification of DL systems have been recently proposed to fill in the gap [19] , [27] , [34] , [40] . Most of these techniques share two assumptions. The first assumption is essentially a generalisation of the essence of metamorphic testing [11] : if two inputs to a DL system are similar with respect to some human sense, the outputs should also be similar. For example, DeepTest [40] checks whether an autonomous driving system behaves in the same way when the input image is transformed as if the same scene is under a different weather condition. The second assumption, also based in more traditional software testing results [15] , is that the more diverse a set of input is, the more effective testing of a DL system one can perform. For example, DeepXplore [34] presented the Neuron Coverage (the ratio of neurons whose activation values were above a predefined threshold) as the measure of diversity of neuron behaviour, and subsequently showed that inputs violating the first assumption will also increase the neuron coverage.
While the recently introduced techniques have made significant advances over manual ad hoc testing of DL systems, there is a major limitation. The coverage criteria proposed so far are not sufficiently fine grained, in a sense that all of them simply count neurons whose activation values satisfy certain conditions. While this aggregation by counting does allow the tester to quantify the test effectiveness of a given input set, it conveys little information about individual inputs. For example, it is not immediately clear when an input with higher NC should be considered better than another with lower NC, and why: certain inputs may naturally activate more neurons above the threshold than others, and vice versa. Another example is the k-Multisection Neuron Coverage [27] , which partitions the ranges of activation values of neurons, observed during training, into k buckets, and count the number of total buckets covered by a set of inputs. When measured for a single input, the coverage will be either 1 k if the input activates each neuron with a value from one of the k buckets, or smaller than that if some neurons activate outside the range observed during training. Again, the information about how far such activations go beyond observed range is lost during aggregation, making it hard to evaluate the relative value of each input. For a test adequacy criterion to be practically useful, it should be able to guide the selection of individual inputs, eventually resulting in improvements of the accuracy of the DL system under investigation.
To overcome these limitations, we propose a new test adequacy for DL systems, called Surprise Adequacy for DL systems (SADL). Intuitively, a good test input set for a DL system should be systematically diversified to include inputs ranging from those similar to training data to those significantly different and adversarial. 1 At individual input granularity, SADL measures how surprising the input is to a DL system with respect to the data the system was trained with: the actual measure of surprise can be either based on the likelihood of the system having seen a similar input during training (here with respect to probability density distributions extrapolated from the training process using kernel density estimation [41] ), or the distance between vectors representing the neuron activation traces of the given input and the training data (here simply using Euclidean distance). Subsequently, the Surprise Adequacy (SA) of a set of test inputs is measured by the range of individual surprise values the set covers. We show that SADL is sufficiently fine grained by training adversarial example classifiers based on SADL values that can produce higher accuracy compared to the state of the art. We also show that sampling inputs according to SADL for retraining DL systems can result in higher accuracy, thus showing that SADL is an independent variable that can positively affect the effectiveness of DL system testing.
The technical contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose SADL, a fine grained test adequacy metric that measures the surprise of an input, i.e., the difference in the behaviour of a DL system between a given input and the training data. [6] and Chauffeur [1] ). All implementations are available online. 2 The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces Surprise Adequacy for DL systems, SADL: two variants of SADL are presented along with algorithms that measure them. Section III sets out the research questions and Section IV describes the experimental set-up of the empirical evaluations. Section V presents the results from empirical evaluations. Section VI addresses threats to validity. Section VII presents related work, and Section VIII concludes.
II. SURPRISE ADEQUACY FOR DEEP LEARNING SYSTEMS
All existing test adequacy criteria for DL systems aim to measure the diversity of an input set. Neuron Coverage (NC) [34] posits that the higher the number of neurons that are activated above a predefined threshold, the more diverse input the DL system has been executed with. DeepGauge [27] proposed a range of finer grained adequacy criteria including k-Multisection Neuron Coverage, which measures the ratio of activation value buckets that have been covered across all neurons, and Neuron Boundary Coverage, which measures the ratio of neurons that are activated beyond the ranges observed during training.
We argue that diversity in testing of DL systems is more meaningful when it is measured with respect to the training data, as DL systems are likely to be more error prone for inputs that are unfamiliar, i.e., diverse. Furthermore, while neuron activation above thresholds, or beyond observed ranges, may be closely related to diversity of the given input, they do not measure to what degree the activations of the network for one input differs from the activations for another input. They are fundamentally discretisations and do not utilize the fact that neuron activations are continuous quantities. In contrast, our aim is to define an adequacy criterion that quantitatively measures behavioural differences observed in a given set of inputs, relative to the training data.
A. Activation Trace and Surprise Adequacy
Let N = {n 1 , n 2 , . . .} be a set of neurons that constitutes a DL system D, and let X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . .} be a set of inputs. We denote the activation value of a single neuron n with respect to an input x as α n (x). For an ordered (sub)set of neurons, let N ⊆ N, α N (x) denote a vector of activation values, each element corresponding to an individual neuron in N : the cardinality of α N (x) is equal to |N |. We call α N (x) the Activation Trace (AT) of x over neurons in N . Similarly, let A N (X) be a set of activation traces, observed over neurons in N , for a set of inputs X: A N (X) = {α N (x) | x ∈ X}. We note that the activation trace is trivially available after each execution of the network for a given input.
Since behaviours of DL systems are driven along the dataflow and not control-flow, we assume that activation traces observed over all N with respect to X, A N (X), fully captures the behaviours of the DL system under investigation when executed using X. 3 Surprise Adequacy (SA) aims to measure the relative novelty (i.e., surprise) of a given new input with respect to the inputs used for training. Given a training set T, we first compute A N (T) by recording activation values of all neurons using every input in the training data set. Subsequently, given a new input x, we measure how surprising x is when compared to T by comparing the activation trace of x to A N (T). This quantitative similarity measure is called Surprise Adequacy (SA). We introduce two variants of SA, each with different way of measuring the similarity between x and A N (T). 4 Note that certain types of DL tasks allow us to focus on parts of the training set T to get more precise and meaningful measurement of SA. For example, suppose we are testing a classifier with a new input x, which is classified by the DL system under investigation as the class c. In this case, the surprise of x is more meaningfully measured against A N (T c ), in which T c is the subset of T where members are classified as c. Basically, the input might be surprising as an example of class c even if not surprising in relation to the full set of training examples.
B. Likelihood-based Surprise Adequacy
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) [41] is a way of estimating the probability density function of a given random variable. The resulting density function allows the estimation of relative likelihood of a specific value of the random variable. Likelihood-based SA (LSA) uses KDE to estimate the probability density of each activation value in A N (T), and obtains the surprise of a new input with respect to the estimated density. This is an extension of existing work that uses KDE to detect adversarial examples [14] . To reduce dimensionality and computational cost, we only consider the neurons in a selected layer N L ⊆ N, which yields a set of activation traces, A NL (X). To further reduce the computational cost, we filter out neurons whose activation values show variance lower than a pre-defined threshold, t, as these neurons will not contribute much information to KDE. The cardinality of each trace will be |N L |. Given a bandwidth matrix H and Gaussian kernel function K, the activation trace of the new input x, and x i ∈ T, KDE produces density functionf as follows:
Since we want to measure the surprise of the input x, we need a metric that increases when probability density decreases (i.e., the input is rarer compared to the training data), and vice versa (i.e., the input is similar to the training data). Adopting common approach of converting probability density to a measure of rareness [26] , [39] , we define LSA to be the negative of the log of density:
Note that extra information about input types can be used to make LSA more precise. For example, given a DL classifier D, we expect inputs that share the same class label will have similar ATs. We can exploit this by computing LSA per class, replacing T with {x ∈ T | D(x) = c} for class c. We use per-class LSA for DL classifiers in our empirical evaluation. x 2a to class c 2 , AT of x 1 is farther out from class c 1 than that of x 2 , i.e., a1 b1 > a2 b2 (see Equations 3, 4, and 5). Consequently, we decide that x 1 is more surprising than x 2 w.r.t. class c 1 .
C. Distance-based Surprise Adequacy
An alternative to LSA is simply to use the distance between ATs as the measure of surprise. Here, we define Distancebased Surprise Adequacy (DSA) using the Euclidean distance between the AT of a new input x and ATs observed during training. Being a distance metric, DSA is ideally suited to exploit the boundaries between inputs, as can be seen in the classification example in Figure 1 . By comparing the distances a 1 and a 2 (i.e., distance between the AT of a new input and the reference point, which is the nearest AT of training data in c 1 ) to distances b 1 and b 2 (i.e., distance to c 2 measured from the reference point), we get a sense of how close to the class boundary the new inputs are. We posit that, for classification problems, inputs that are closer to class boundaries are more surprising and valuable in terms of test input diversity. On the other hand, for tasks without any boundaries between inputs, such as prediction of appropriate steering angle for autonomous driving car, DSA may not be easily applicable. With no class boundaries, an AT of a new input being far from that of another training input does not guarantee that the new input is surprising, as the AT may still be located in crowded parts of the AT space. Consequently, we only apply DSA for classification tasks, for which it can be more effective than LSA (see Section V-A and V-B for more details).
Let us assume that a DL system D, which consists of a set of neurons N, is trained for a classification task with a set of classes C, using a training dataset T. Given the set of activation traces A N (T), a new input x, and a predicted class of the new input c x ∈ C, we define the reference point x a to be the closest neighbour of x that shares the same class. The distance between x and x a follows from the definition:
Subsequently, from x a , we find the closest neighbour of x a in a class other than c x , x b , and the distance dist b , as follows:
Intuitively, DSA aims to compare the distance from the AT of a new input x to known ATs belonging to its own class, c x , to the known distance between ATs in class c x and ATs in other classes in C \ {c x }. If the former is relatively larger than the latter, x would be a surprising input for class c x to the classifying DL system D. While there are multiple ways to formalise this we select a simple one and calculate DSA as the ratio between dist a and dist b . Investigation of more complicated formulations is left as future work.
D. Surprise Coverage
Given a set of inputs, we can also measure the range of SA values the set covers, called Surprise Coverage (SC). Since both LSA and DSA are defined in continuous spaces, we use bucketing to discretise the space of surprise and define both Likelihood-based Surprise Coverage (LSC) and Distancebased Surprise Coverage (DSC). Given an upper bound of U , and buckets B = {b 1 , b 2 , ..., b n } that divide (0, U] into n SA segments, SC for a set of inputs X is defined as follows:
A set of inputs with high SC is a diverse set of inputs ranging from similar to those seen during training (i.e., low SA) to very different from what was seen during training (i.e., high SA). We argue that an input set for a DL system should not only be diversified, but systematically diversified considering SA. Recent results also validate this notion by showing that more distant test inputs were more likely to lead to exceptions but might not be as relevant for testing [35] .
While we use the term cover and coverage, the implications of SA based coverage is different from the traditional structural coverage. First, unlike most of the structural coverage criteria, there is no finite set of targets to cover, as in statement or branch coverage: an input can, at least in theory, be arbitrarily surprising. However, an input with arbitrarily high SA value may simply be irrelevant, or at least less interesting, to the problem domain (e.g., an image of a traffic sign will be irrelevant to the testing of animal photo classifiers). As such, SC can only be measured with respect to pre-defined upper bound, in the same way the theoretically infinite path coverage is bounded by a parameter [44] . Second, SC does not render itself to a combinatorial set cover problem, which the test suite minimisation is often formulated into [43] . This is because a single input yields only a single SA value and cannot belong to multiple SA buckets. The sense of redundancy with respect to SC as a coverage criteria is weaker than that of structural coverage, for which a single input can cover multiple targets. While we aim to show that SA can guide the better selection of inputs, rigorous study of optimisation of test suites for DL systems remains a future work. However, as we show with our empirical studies, SC can still guide test input selection.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our empirical evaluation is designed to answer the following research questions.
RQ1. Surprise: Is SADL capable of capturing the relative surprise of an input of a DL system?
We provide answers to RQ1 from different angles. First, we compute the SA of each test input included in the original dataset, and see if a DL classifier finds inputs with higher surprise more difficult to correctly classify. We expect more surprising input to be harder to correctly classify. Second [5] : subsequent work that introduced KDE based adversarial example detection technique [14] assumes the deepest (i.e., the last hidden) layer to contain the most information helpful for detection. We evaluate this In addition to capturing input surprise, we want SC to be consistent with existing coverage criteria based on counting aggregation. If not, there is a risk that SC is in fact measuring something other than input diversity. For this, we check whether SC is correlated with other criteria. We control the input diversity by cumulatively adding inputs generated by different method (i.e., different adversarial example generation techniques or input synthesis techniques), execute the studied DL systems with these input, and compare the observed changes of various coverage criteria including SC and four existing ones: DeepXplore's Neuron Coverage (NC) [40] and three Neuron-level Coverages (NLCs) introduced by Deep-Gauge [27] : k-Multisection Neuron Coverage (KMNC), Neuron Boundary Coverage (NBC), and Strong Neuron Activation Coverage (SNAC).
For MNIST and CIFAR-10, we start from the original test data provided by the dataset (10,000 images), and add 1,000 adversarial examples, generated by FGSM, BIM-A, BIM-B, JSMA, and C&W, at each step. For Dave-2, we start from the original test data (5,614 images) and add 700 synthetic images generated by DeepXplore at each step. For Chauffeur, each step adds 1,000 synthetic images (Set1 to Set3), each produced by applying random number of DeepTest transformations. 3U 4 ]), and finally the entire range, [0, U]. These four subsets are expected to represent increasingly more diverse sets of inputs. We set the range R to one of these four, randomly sample 100 images from each R, and train existing models for five additional epochs. Finally, we measure each model's performance (accuracy for MNIST and CIFAR-10, MSE for Dave-2) against the entire adversarial and synthetic inputs, respectively. We expect retraining with more diverse subset will result in higher performance.
RQ4. Guidance

IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We evaluate SADL on four different DL systems using (a) the original test sets, (b) adversarial examples generated by five attack strategies, and (c) synthetic inputs generated by DeepXplore [34] and DeepTest [40] . This section describes the studied DL systems and the input generation methods. Table I lists the subject datasets and models of DL systems. MNIST [25] and CIFAR-10 [21] are widely used datasets for machine learning research, each of which is a collection of images in ten different classes. For MNIST, we adopt the widely studied five layer Convolutional Neural Network (ConvNet) with max-pooling and dropout layers and train it to achieve 99.31% accuracy on the provided test set. Similarly, the adopted model for CIFAR is a 12-layer ConvNet with max-pooling and dropout layers, trained to achieve 82.27% accuracy on the provided test set.
A. Datasets and DL Systems
For evaluation of SADL for DL systems in safety critical domains, we use the Udacity self-driving car challenge dataset [2] , which contains a collection of camera images from the driving car. As its aim is to predict steering wheel angle, the model accuracy is measured using Mean Squared Error (MSE) between actual and predicted steering angles. We use a pre-trained Dave-2 model [6] , which is a public artefact provided by DeepXplore 6 , and a pre-trained Chauffeur model [1] , made publicly available by the Udacity self-driving car challenge. Dave-2 consists of nine layers including five convolutional layers, and achieves 0.09 in MSE. Chauffeur consists of both a ConvNet and an LSTM sub-model, and achieves 0.10 in MSE.
B. Adversarial Examples and Synthetic Inputs
SADL is evaluated using both adversarial examples and synthetic test inputs. Adversarial examples are crafted by applying, to the original input, small perturbations imperceptible to humans, until the DL system under investigation behaves incorrectly [16] . We rely on adversarial attacks to generate input images for MNIST and CIFAR-10: these generated images are more likely to reveal robustness issues in the DL systems than the test inputs provided by the original datasets. We use five widely studied attack strategies to evaluate SADL: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16] , Basic Iterative Method (BIM-A, BIM-B) [23] , Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [33] , and Carlini&Wagner (C&W) [9] . Our implementation of these strategies is based on cleverhans [32] and a framework of Ma et al. [30] .
For Dave-2 and Chauffeur, we use the state-of-the-art synthetic input generation algorithms, DeepXplore [34] and DeepTest [40] . Both algorithms are designed to synthesise new test input from existing ones with the aim of detecting erroneous behaviours in autonomous driving vehicle. For Dave-2, we use DeepXplore's input generation via joint optimization algorithm, whose aim is to generate inputs that lead multiple DL systems trained independently, but using the same training data, to disagree with each other. Using Dave-2 and its two variants, Dave-dropout and Dave-norminit, we collect synthetic inputs generated by lighting effect (Light), occlusion by a single black rectangle (SingleOcc), and occlusion by multiple black rectangles (MultiOcc). For Chauffeur, we synthesise new inputs by iteratively applying random transformations provided by DeepTest to original input images: translation, scale, shear, rotation, contrast, brightness, and blur. 7 
C. Configurations
For all research questions, the default activation variance threshold for LSA is set to 10 −5 , and the bandwidth for KDE is set using Scott's Rule [36] . The remaining of this Section details RQ specific configurations. For RQ1, we use the activation 2 layer for MNIST, and activation 6 for CIFAR-10, when computing LSA values. Computation of LSA based on all neurons is computationally infeasible due to precision loss. For RQ2, we set the activation variance threshold for layers activation 7 and activation 8 of CIFAR-10 to 10 −4 , which reduces the number of neurons used for the computation of LSA and, consequently, the computational cost. For computation of other coverage criteria in RQ3, we use the configurations in Table II . The threshold of NC is set to 0.5. For NLCs, we all set the number of sections (k) to 1,000. For LSC and DSC, we manually choose the layer, the number of buckets (n), and the upper bound (ub). For RQ4, the layers chosen for MNIST and CIFAR-10 are activation 3 and activation 5 respectively. We perform 20 runs of retraining for each subject and report the statistics.
All experiments were performed on machines equipped with Intel i7-8700 CPU, 32GB RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS. MNIST and CIFAR-10 are implemented using Keras v.2.2.0.
V. RESULT
Due to the space limit, we cannot include all plots and tables and make them available online: https://coinse.github.io/sadl. Figure 2 shows how the classification accuracy changes when we classify sets of images of growing sizes from the test inputs included in the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset. The sets of images corresponding to the red dots (Ascending SA) start with images with the lowest SA, and increasingly include images with higher SA in the ascending order of SA; the sets of images corresponding to the blue dots grow in the opposite direction (i.e., from images with the highest SA to lower SA). As a reference, the green dots show the mean accuracy of randomly growing sets across 20 repetitions. It is clear that including images with higher LSA values, i.e., more surprising images, leads to lower accuracy. For visual confirmation on another dataset, we also chose sets of inputs synthesised for Chauffeur by DeepTest, from three distinct levels of LSA values: Figure 3 shows that the higher the LSA values are, the harder it is to recognise images visually. Both quantitatively and visually, the observed trend supports our claim that SADL captures input surprise: even for unseen inputs, SA can measure how surprising the given input is, which is directly related to the performance of the DL system. Figure 4 shows plots of sorted DSA values of 10,000 adversarial examples, generated by each of the five techniques, as well as the original test inputs. Figure 5 contains Fig. 2 : Accuracy of test inputs in MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset, selected from the input with the lowest SA, increasingly including inputs with higher SA, and vice versa (i.e., from the input with the highest SA to inputs with lower SA).
A. Input Surprise (RQ1)
10. 8 The results show that the gap in DSA values observed in Figure 4 can be used to classify adversarial examples with high accuracy. For the relatively simpler MNIST model, the DSAbased classifier can detect adversarial examples with ROC-AUC ranging from 96.97% to 99.38%. The DSA-based classification for the more complicated CIFAR-10 model shows lower ROC-AUC values, but answers to RQ2 suggest that DSA from specific layers can produce significantly higher accuracy (see Section V-B).
Based on three different analyses, the answer to RQ1 is that 8 LSA-based classification is only possible for subsets of neurons due to the computational cost of KDE; hence we introduce the results of LSA-based classification when answering the impact of layer selection for RQ2. 
B. Impact of Layer Selection (RQ2)
Table IV shows the ROC-AUC of classification of adversarial examples, resulting in each row corresponding to a classifier trained on LSA and DSA from a specific layer in MNIST, respectively. Rows are ordered by their depth, i.e., activation 3 is the deepest and the last hidden layer in MNIST. The highest ROC-AUC values for each attack strategy are typeset in bold. For MNIST, there is no clear evidence that the deepest layer is the most effective. The cases for which ROC-AUC is 100% can be explained by Figure 5 : LSA values from activation 1 of MNIST, for example, show a clear separation between the original test inputs and FGSM, BIM-A, or BIM-B: by choosing an appropriate threshold, it is possible to completely separate test inputs from adversarial examples. Similarly, the plot of LSA from activation 3 of MNIST shows that C&W LSA line crossing with that of the original test data (i.e., C&W adversarial examples are less surprising than the original test data): this results in the low ROC-AUC value of 37.96%. Table V contains the ROC-AUC values of LSA-and DSAbased classifiers, trained on each layer of the CIFAR-10 model: for each attack strategy, the highest ROC-AUC values are typeset in bold. Interestingly, LSA and DSA show different trends with CIFAR-10. With LSA, there is no strong evidence that the deepest layer produces the most accurate classifiers. However, with DSA, the deepest layer produces the most accurate classifiers for three out of five attack strategies (BIM-B, JSMA, and C&W), while the second deepest layer produces the most accurate classifier for BIM-A. More importantly, perlayer DSA values produce much more accurate classification results than all neuron DSA values, as can be seen in the comparison between Table III and Table IV & Based on these results, we answer RQ2 that DSA is sensitive to the selection of layers it is computed from, and benefits from choosing the deeper layer. However, for LSA, there is no clear evidence supporting the deeper layer assumption. The layer sensitivity varies across different adversarial example generation strategies.
C. Correlation between SC and Other Criteria (RQ3)
Table VI shows how different coverage criteria respond to increasing diversity levels 9 . Columns represent steps, at each of which more inputs are added to the original test set. If the increase in coverage at a step is less than 0.1 percentage point when compared to the previous step, the value is underlined. The threshold of 0.1 percentage point is based on the finest step change possible for LSC, DSC, as well as KMNC, as all three use bucketing with k = 1, 000. We acknowledge that the threshold is arbitrary, and provide it only as a supporting aid. Note that DSC cannot be computed for these two DL systems, as they are not classifiers (see Section II-C).
Overall, most of the studied criteria increase as additional inputs are added at each step. The notable exception is NC, which plateaus against many steps. This is in line with results in existing work [27] . There exists an interplay between the type of added inputs and how different criteria respond: SNAC, KMNC, and NBC show significant increases with the addition of BIM-B examples to CIFAR-10, but change little when C&W inputs are added. However, only SNAC and NBC exhibit a similar increase with the addition of input Set 1 for Chauffeur, while KMNC increases more steadily. Overall, with the exception of NC, we answer RQ3 that SC is correlated with other coverage criteria introduced so far.
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D. Retraining Guidance (RQ4)
Table VII shows the impact of SA-based guidance for retraining of MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Dave-2 models. The column R from 1 4 to 4 4 represents the increasingly wider ranges of SA from which the inputs for additional training are sampled; rows with R = ∅ show performance of the DL system before retraining. Overall, there are 23 retraining configurations (2 SA types × 2 DL systems × 5 adversarial attack strategies, and 1 SA type × 1 DL system × three input synthesis methods), each of which is evaluated against four SA ranges with 20 repetitions. Columns μ and σ contain the mean and standard deviation of observed performance metric (i.e., the highest accuracy for MNIST and CIFAR-10, the lowest MSE for Dave-2). The best performance is typeset in bold.
The full range, 4 4 , produces the best retraining performance for 13 configurations, followed by 2 4 (5 configurations), 3 4 (3 configurations), and 1 4 (3 configurations). Note that for the configuration of CIFAR-10 and BIM-B, both ranges 2 4 and 3 4 produces the same and the best retraining performance. The largest improvement is observed when retraining MNIST against FGSM using DSA: the accuracy of the 4 4 range shows 77.5% increase from that of 1 4 (i.e., from 15.60% to 28.69%). While retraining MNIST against BIM-B using DSA shows even greater improvement (from 9.40% to 40.94%), we suspect this is an outlier as the accuracy for ranges 1 4 3U 4 ], and [0, U], and retrain for five additional epochs using the samples as the training data, and measure the accuracy and MSE against the entire adversarial and synthetic inputs. Sampling from wider ranges improves the retraining accuracy.
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY
The primary threat to internal validity of this study is the correctness of implementation of the studied DL systems, as well as the computation of SA values. We have used publicly available architectures and pre-trained models as our subjects to avoid incorrect implementation. SA computation depends on a widely used computation library, SciPy, which has stood the public scrutiny. Threats to external validity mostly concerns the number of the models and input generation techniques we study here. It is possible that SADL is less effective against other DL systems. While we believe the core principle of measuring input surprise is universally applicable, only further experimentations can reduce this particular risk. Finally, threats to construct validity asks whether we are measuring the correct factors to draw our conclusion. For all studied DL systems, activation traces are immediate artefacts of their executions and the meaning of output accuracy is well established, minimising the risk of this threat.
VII. RELATED WORK
Adversarial examples pose significant threats to the performance of DL systems [7] . There are existing work in the machine learning community on detection of such inputs. Feinman et al. [14] first introduced the KDE as a means of similarity measurement, with the aim of detecting adversarial examples. SADL improves upon the existing work by a number of different ways. First, we generalise the concept of Surprise Adequacy (SA) and introduce Distance-based SA. Second, our evaluation is in the context of DL system testing. Third, our evaluation of SADL includes more complicated and practical DL systems, as well as testing techniques such as DeepXplore and DeepTest. Finally, we show that the choice of neurons has limited impact on LSA.
A range of techniques has been recently proposed to test and verify DL systems. The existing techniques are largely based on two assumptions. The first assumption is a variation of metamorphic testing [11] , [31] , [42] . Suppose a DL system N produces an output o when given i as the input, i.e., N (i) = o. Then we expect N (i ) o when i i . Huang et al. [19] proposed a verification technique that can automatically generate counter-examples that violate this assumption. Pei et al. introduced DeepXplore [34], a white-box technique that generates test inputs that cause disagreement among a set of DL systems, i.e., N m (i) = N n (i) for independently trained DL systems N m and N n . Tian et al. presented DeepTest, whose metamorphic relations include both simple geometric perturbations as well as realistic weather effects [40] . The second assumption is that the more diverse a set of input is, the more effective it will be for testing and validating DL systems. Pei et al. proposed Neuron Coverage (NC), which measures the ratio of neurons whose activation values are above a predefined threshold [34] . It has been shown that adding test inputs that violate the first assumption increases the diversity measured through NC. Similarly, DeepGauge introduced a set of multi-granularity coverage criteria that are thought to reflect behaviours of DL systems in finer granularity [27] . While these criteria capture input diversity, all of them are essentially count of neurons unlike SA, and therefore cannot be directly linked to behaviours of DL systems. We show that SA is closely related to the behaviours by training accurate adversarial example classifiers based on SA.
Apart from coverage criteria, other concepts in traditional software testing have been reformulated and applied to testing of DL systems. Ma et al. proposed DeepCT, which views ranges of neuron activation values as parameter choices and applies Combinatorial Interaction Testing (CIT) to measure interaction coverage [29] . SC is different from DeepCT as SADL aims to quantify the amount of surprise, rather than simply to detect surprise via increase in coverage. DeepMutation applies the principle of mutation testing to DL systems by mutating training data, test data, as well as the DL system itself, based on source and model level mutation operators [28] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
We propose SADL, a surprise adequacy framework for DL systems that can quantitatively measure relative surprise of each input with respect to the training data, which we call Surprise Adequacy (SA). Using SA, we also develop Surprise Coverage (SC), which measures the coverage of discretised input surprise ranges, rather than the count of neurons with specific activation traits. Our empirical evaluation shows that SA and SC can capture the surprise of inputs accurately and are good indicators of how DL systems will react to unknown inputs. SA is correlated with how difficult a DL system finds an input, and can be used to accurately classify adversarial examples. SC can be used to guide selection of inputs for more effective retraining of DL systems for adversarial examples as well as inputs synthesised by DeepXplore.
